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E R IC E. PETERSON

DIVERSITY AND FRANCO-AMERICAN IDENTITY
POLITICS

As Barry Rodrigue suggests, there are many
definitions of Franco-American identity. In this article
Eric Peterson explores these multiple meanings which,
as he points out, are rooted in the ways different groups
interact. I f cultural differences are to serve our society
as a source of flexibility and creativity, we must learn
to appreciate diversity in our daily interactions.

The renewed controversy over immigration in recent years
challenges the value of “diversity” and “ethnic identity” in the
United States.1 Scholarship on these issues has vacillated over
the decades. Traditionally, Americans believed that assimilation
into the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture and the eradication of
ethnic difference was an ideal goal. More recently, scholars like
Gregory Bateson have argued that diversity and difference
among social groups is not only inevitable but desirable. Bateson
believes that a healthy ecology of human civilization requires
“diversity in the civilization, not only to accommodate the
genetic and experiential diversity of persons, but also to provide
the flexibility and 'preadaptation’ necessary for unpredictable
change.”2 However, this view of ethnic identity is not based on
a definition of difference as the possession of specific ethnic,
racial, or national attributes. This article focuses on issues of
identity based on relationships between groups. As Kobena
Mercer states, “identities are not found but made;...they are not
just there, waiting to be discovered in the vocabulary of Nature,
but...culturally and politically constructed through political an
tagonism and cultural struggle.”"1
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raditionally, scholars assumed that assimilation was
a desirable goal. The concept, however, did not
mean the same thing to everyone. Iris Marion
Young identifies a “conformist ideal” and a “transformational
ideal” of assimilation.4 A recent column by George Will on
immigration illustrates these two views. The conformist view
denies the reality o f social groups.
Will identifies an
“anti-assimilationist impulse” as coming “primarily from those
native-born intellectuals who believe America is a sick, racist,
sexist, exploitative, oppressive, patriarchal, etc. society into
which no self-respecting person would wish to assimilate.” It is
important to note that by “native-born” Will does not mean
American Indian. He uses the term to refer to the descendants
of European immigrants, in contrast with current immigrants
from Mexico, Central America, and Asia. In other words, Will
conveniently ignores the “anti-assimilationist impulse” of Euro
pean colonists who did not attempt to assimilate into existing
American Indian cultures between 1607 and 1890. Indeed, they
attempted to destroy them. Will assumes “America” to be an
intact, already existing culture. As he states, “Debate should
begin with this premise: America...is a culture”
The conformist view sees social group identity and advo
cacy simply as a means to gain special privileges that would be
otherwise unobtainable. Affirmative action programs are criti
cized for promoting “quotas” and “reverse discrimination” as
privileges for specific social groups - what in Will’s argument is
called an “entitlement mentality.” The conformist view does not
deny that individuals possess a particular ethnic ancestry. Rather,
it sees such ethnic ancestry as past, and not present, as part of
each person’s background and not their daily life. Hence no one
particular ethnic group “exists” in the sense that it defines
identity in everyday life.
In Maine, where approximately 35 percent of the popula
tion claims French, French-Canadian, or Franco-American an
cestry, the conformist view pervades the dominant culture of
mass media, schools, and business. With the exception of a few
communities and sections of the state, a visitor to Maine would
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be hard pressed to learn o f even the existence of FrancoAmericans. As Denis Ledoux points out, when one drives down
a Maine highway there are plenty of signs proclaiming “Yankee
G rocer,” “Yankee Carwash,” or “Yankee Housebuilder”; “Obvi
ously being Yankee is something to...announce publicly.” Simi
lar signs proclaiming Franco-American identity are non-existent.5
Major state newspapers or television broadcasts rarely draw
attention to Franco-American heritage or culture. When
Franco-American identity is noticed, it is in such stories as the
yearly Acadian Festival: coverage which reduces the festival to
the status of other “similar” events such as lobster, egg, blue
berry, or potato festivals. A nother group of stories on
Franco-American identity occurs in isolated reports on the
discrimination and harassment of Francos, which plays into the
conformist view that social group identity is merely a means for
gaining unfair advantage through legal manipulation.
The transformational view, on the other hand, accepts the
existence of social groups but denies their desirability. Those
who accept the transformational view acknowledge particular
ethnic heritages, but see their continuation as undesirable. This
perspective is epitomized in the view of the United States as the
“melting pot,” wherein ethnic group identity is to be dissolved
into a homogeneous "national” identity.
For Franco-Americans in Maine, the transformational view
is not merely an external force; pressure for assimilation also
comes from within the Franco community. In describing these
pressures, D. Poulin writes that:
Most French-Canadian-Americans of my genera
tion spent the better part of our adolescence and
early adulthood working hard at negating and
trying to erase all traces of our French-Canadian
heritage. First the accent, then the language, then
the faith, the customs and the “manners.” We
were “White Niggers,” hell bent on becoming
categorically assimilated.6
The attempt to erase ethnic differences is not accidental,
but forms an important part of the assimilation ideal.
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The ideal of assimilation devalues difference in a two-step
operation. First, the ethnic identity of privileged groups is
assumed to be “American” and therefore neutral and universal.
Second, non-privileged groups are seen as "modified Ameri
cans” and are identified by such labels as Franco-American,
Native-American, or African-American. Their assimilation in
volves the negation and stripping away of anything which marks
their uniqueness. The uniqueness of privileged groups, by
contrast, remains "unmarked” and unaltered.
The devaluing of difference exploits ethnic groups as a
means to establish dominant-group identity. Ethnic groups
function as a resource by which an “us” can be defined and a
stable identity maintained. However, such thinking threatens
society, Bateson argues, because it pits the survival of privileges
for specific groups against a cultural environment of multiple
groups. And any civilization that destroys its cultural environ
ment, in order to maintain a particular system of privileges,
threatens its own existence. Thus, the opposition of privileged
identity and multicultural environment is a false opposition in
that the destruction of a multicultural environment entails the
destruction of the privileged system which it supports. As
Bateson remarks, “the creature that wins against its environment
destroys itselfS'1
he challenge of developing a critical perspective on
multiculturalism requires rethinking the meaning
of difference and identity.8 A recent incident involv
ing a radio broadcast illustrates the importance of not merely
celebrating “essences” or excluded groups in society. In
1992-1993, the Holocaust Human Rights Center, the Associa
tion Canado-Amricain, and other groups protested a radio
comedy routine broadcast by WBLM of Portland. The broad
casts featured a Franco-American character called “Frenchie,”
who spoke with a pronounced accent and told jokes or stories.
The Holocaust Human Rights Center claimed that the broad
casts were examples of bigotry and prejudice. They singled out
one skit, in which “Frenchie” had difficulty in counting record
albums, as particularly offensive. The radio station management
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claimed that the “Frenchie” character was not derogatory be
cause the person who played him was a Franco-American. They
authenticated Frenchie because he possessed a specific ancestry,
which in turn constituted his identity. One could argue that
“non-authentic” groups - such as the Holocaust Human Rights
Center - had no basis for questioning the radio station. How
could a non-Franco-American know better than a Franco-Amer
ican what is derogatory?
Rather than define difference according to static categories
such as ancestry, Young suggests a relational understanding of
difference based on interactions among groups and institutions.
She emphasizes group affinities rather than a listing of specific
characteristics or a common ancestry.
Membership in a social group is a function not of
satisfying some objective criteria, but of a subjec
tive affirmation of affinity with that group, the
affirmation of that affinity by other members of
the group, and the attribution of membership in
that group by persons identifying with other
groups.9
The affinities which differentiate Franco-Americans in Maine
illustrate such a relational understanding. Let us briefly explore
six of the multiple and heterogeneous borders which mark out
Franco-American identity: language, class, gender, age, religion,
and schooling.
While language initially may appear to be an easy difference
to use in identifying Franco-Americans, such a singular emphasis
repeats the errors of categorization. After all, not all Francophones
are Franco-A m erican, and not all Franco-A m ericans are
Francophones. A recent incident at Bates College illustrates how
language cannot be separated from other forms of affinity. Bates
College President Donald W. Harward issued an order to
suspend the practice of asking employees not to speak French if
a non French-speaking employee was nearby. Harward com
mented that “evidently, isolated practices, developed over a
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decade ago, were initiated in several service departments for the
positive intention of being courteous.”10 Typically, speaking
French, in and of itself, is not seen as a problem in colleges especially when most schools go to great lengths to encourage
student enrollments in language courses. In this case, however,
it was not the use of French by students or faculty that was at
issue, but the language used by service employees. Until Harward’s
intervention, class clearly distinguished the group whose lan
guage required control.
While shared language is often assumed as the difference
which marks inclusion and exclusion in a group, other differ
ences may supersede language in articulating affinities. For
example, when a Franco-American woman applied for member
ship in Le Club Calumet of Augusta - a club whose stated goals
are the promotion of French culture and language - her applica
tion was rejected on the basis of gender.11 The effort by Le Club
Calumet to exclude women is part of a larger historical struggle
of social clubs to control privilege through membership. Such
rules reject women, as well as members of “other” social groups.
They assume that one group, in this case men, set the criteria for
group membership, and this group can “prom ote” French
culture and language. Ironically, as Labbe points out, the Club
ignores arguments within the Franco community that “women
have been and are the principal transmitters of the culture and
language.”12 What this example illustrates is the failure of
categorical criteria (as in men of French ancestry) as a way to
define difference.
For some Franco-Americans, Anglo culture is a substitute
for a culture which they think is too conservative. “Teenage
rebellion” provides Franco youth a way to emphasize other
affinities, such as age, and displace those of their parents and
community. Another example of how “rebellion” can be articu
lated in different ways can be seen in the use of “Frog” by the
University of Maine Franco-American Center. The Center
initially used “Frog” in its telephone number as a strategy to
reclaim the power of naming.13 This strategy, which recalls other
renaming efforts such as “black is beautiful” and “gay pride,” is
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effective because it operates in a specific college-aged commu
nity, in a specific historical context. When separated from this
context, the term “Frog” is viewed as an ethnic slur, rather than
a renaming. For example, “Frenchie” challenged critics from the
University for being hypocritical: they criticized his perpetuating
“dumb Frenchman” stereotypes when they themselves used the
word “Frog.” The danger of rebellion is that it may reinforce
reactionary rather than revisionary efforts.
One of the institutional affinities which structures Franco
American communities is the Roman Catholic church. As a
physical entity in Franco American communities, the church is
often the largest building and tends to dominate the landscape,
as well as the culture. J. Dufresne refers to this cultural, as well
as religious domination in his comment that
We French kids were not eager to succumb to the
American Protestant ideals of prosperity, ambi
tion and acquisitiveness. Those were the days of
Franco-Catholicism when we believed that pov
erty was a badge of holiness, a condition to be
embraced and not one to be ashamed o f 11
Nevertheless, not all Franco-Americans are Catholic; nor
do all Catholic Franco-Americans interpret the structuring fea
tures of Roman Catholicism favorably. In fact, priests may have
acted as agents of assimilation during periods of immigration.
For example, parish priests facilitated name changes (“Levesque”
to “Bishop,” or “Boisvert” to “Greenwood”) so that Franco men
would have an easier time finding employment in the mills of
Maine. Some Franco-American women chose not to affiliate
with the Roman Catholic church because of its sexism and male
domination.
As with the church, schools and schooling occupy an
ambiguous place in Franco-American culture. M.A. Perry points
out that many early schools were associated with parishes be
cause public schools refused to teach French. While separate
schooling has the advantage of maintaining an emphasis on the
French language, parochial schools also may emphasize Catholic
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teachings more than Franco-American culture. Perry also points
out that educational separatism may reinforce attitudes of ethnic
superiority in the struggle to maintain cultural survival.15 But not
all Catholic schools fostered Franco-American culture. Levesque
describes a grade school in the St.John Valley that prohibited the
use of French in fifth and sixth grade classes.16
The focus on language, class, gender, age, religion, and
schooling should not obscure the importance of other parts of
Franco-American cultural life - such as work, music, dance, and
food. But as discussion of these examples illustrates, there are
no common or unitary meanings for language, class, gender,
age, religion, and schooling that might define a Franco-American
difference. The differences which mark Franco-American iden
tity are not based in an “essence” or a common “experience.”
Rather, “Franco-American” names a terrain of contested affini
ties and commitments which shape participation of members
within the social group and in contrast to other social groups.
relational definition of difference challenges as
sumptions about the ideal of assimilation and the
meaning of identity. However, relational affinities
must be defined carefully to guard against romanticizing ideal
ized and undifferentiated “folk” communities. This romanti
cism can be found in metaphors used to describe social identity:
“Building bridges,” “tearing down walls,” “or being blind to
difference” suggest that difference is an obstacle, something to
be abolished. As a model for community, this romantic ideal
perpetuates a “metaphysics of presence” in attempting to deny
the lived differences among persons.17 By contrast, a relational
definition uses difference to understand how groups define
themselves in taking social and political action.
Does one have to be Franco-American in order to advance
the interests of Franco-Americans? Does every interest advanced
by a Franco-American constitute an expression of an "authentic”
Franco-American concern? L. Grossberg argues that such “iden
tity politics” tends to perpetuate the assumption that “people act
based on a calculation of their interests, which are rooted in their
experiences, which are determined by their identity, which is an
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expression or representation of their place within a system of
social d iffe re n c e s .”18 Ju s t becau se on e belongs to a
Franco-American community does not mean that one’s commit
ments will necessarily advance the interests ofFranco-Americans.
On the other hand, experience (such as the Franco-American
experience of Anglo-centrism, or women’s experience of male
domination) should not be discarded because there is no simple
or direct connection with ethnic identity.
Grossberg questions whether such identity politics can
effectively oppose conservative views about immigration and
assimilation. Direct experiences which support identity politics
do not necessarily lead to political action. As the earlier
discussion of the Acadian Festival indicates, a celebration of
culture does not necessarily lead to a larger political struggle with
the dominant culture. In a similar way, Labbe’s response to the
“Frenchie” incident suggests the importance of going beyond
cultural action to “engage in and model a public dialogue which
goes beyond the personal and intimate, beyond the family.’'
Such political action is essential, Labbe points out, “if we are to
avoid being tourists within our own culture. We must deal with
the historical hand we have been dealt. Or we are in serious
danger of making up a cultural identity or having it perpetuated
for us.”19
This concern with political action recalls Bateson’s focus on
changing the ways we think about diversity in human civilization.
Bateson thought the ecological crisis would stimulate changes in
our ways of thinking about diversity and would profoundly alter
government, economic structure, and educational philosophy.
“We hope that the period of change may be characterized by
wisdom, rather than by either violence or the fear of violence.”20
If diversity is to serve as a source of social flexibility rather than
an excuse for violence, we must change our habits of thought
about ethnic identity and work to include diversity at both local
and global levels. If Franco-American identity is to mean more
than a celebration of customs and ancestry - or an excuse for
bigotry - we must work to make diversity a productive part of
everyday life and our social and political institutions.
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